

Pol. n^o. 36

A
DEFENCE
OF THE
ALLIES
AND THE
Late Ministry:
OR,
REMARKS
ON THE
Tories New Idol.

BEING
A Detection of the Manifest Frauds and
Falsities, in a late Pamphlet, Entituled,
*The Conduct of the Allies and of the Late
Ministry, in the Beginning and Carrying on
the War.*

LONDON:
Printed, and Sold by J. Baker, at the Black-Boy in
Peter-Noster-Row. 1732.
Price 6 d.

DEFENCE

OF THE

ALLIES

AND THE

late enemies

OF

REMARKS

ON THE

Tories



A Description of the Ancient Coins and
Medals, in a late Pamphlet, printed
The Council of the British Museum, and
the British Museum, in the beginning and ending of
the year.

Printed and sold by J. Smith, at the Black-Boy
Lane, near St. Dunstons Church, 1753.
1753.



REMARKS

ON THE

Tories New Idol.



WHEN an Author purposely Voluminous, seeks to make his Argument good, rather by drowning his Meaning in a Torrent of Words, than by Clear and Intelligible Expressions, crowding the Matters of Fact with the Flourishes of fancied Rhetorick, not explaining Things as they go, it seems to us that One of these Two Things are necessarily the Case. That either *First*, they Labour under

a Scarcity of Evidence, and must bring Things on by Suggestion, begging the Question, and such like Effect of a modest Assurance; or that *Secondly*, presuming upon the present crazy Disposition of the Ages Health, they conclude the Amusement of Words will supply the Want, and serve instead of that Energy and Force of Reasoning, which in most Cases, and at all Times, this Time of Delusion excepted, have been thought necessary to support and defend every Cause that appears in Public.

This I take to be the Case of a New Pamphlet, which is just now come out among us, and which, as it enters the Stage like a Gladiator at the *Bear-garden*, with a great Flourish, Brandishing its Weapons, carrying a fine Feather in its Hat, the Shirt and Hair tied up with Ribbands, a bright Weapon in its Hand in *Terrorem*, and the like; so it comes ushered in by the Shouts and Huzza's of the Rabble, who, according to Custom, always attend it.

These Gladiators, tho' they think the Shows and Shorts useful, yet when they come to close, when they draw towards each other to fight, regarding neither the fine Shirt tied up with Ribbands, the fine Feather in the Hat, or the glistering of the Sword, the Business then is to keep a true Edge, keep their Eye upon their Enemy's Guard,

Guard, see where he aims to Hurt, and where he lyes open to an Advantage.

In like manner, in the attempting to grapple with an Author, who comes thus blustering upon the Stage, shouted in by the whole Tory Mob, and withal shouting out his own Praise, we must take no Notice of his flourishing Introductions; clear the Rubbish of his affected Phrases out of the Way, and if possible, find out what is pointed, and has Meaning in it in his Book. How little this will appear to be, when all the loose Stuff is cut away; how like the Silver in Sir H— M—'s Lead, which never paid the Charge of separating from its Dross; how fit to appear on the Stage, and much less to be usher'd in as before, with such loud Acclamations, we shall, as his whole Tract seems to do, appeal to the People to judge.

Our Author calls his Book *The Conduct of the Allies, and of the Ministry*; which is (being interpreted,) a Design to blacken the Confederates, in order to prepare our People to swallow down a Notion, which we thank God Her Majesty has declared against, (*viz.*) of making a Peace whether they will consent or no; or in brief, to make a *Separate Peace*.

The Author of these Remarks, that he may give as little Trouble to the Reader as possible, and leave the Enemy no room to Cavil, will appear ready to grant all the little Systems of Politicks laid down in the beginning of that Book. Such as the Motives of a Just War, the Measures of Principals and Auxiliaries in their pursuing this War, and that they ought to go farthest who have the first Concern in it. That every Prince ought to consider the Condition he is in when he begins, when he ought to hearken to Peace, and the like; Things any School-boy knows, Nature Dictates, and which seem very far from being sufficient to take up the first Ten Pages of a Book that was to have any Thing of Substance in it, or that any Thing significant was expected from, since all is summ'd up in this, that we ought to consider well when we begin a War, and put an End to it when we can carry it on no longer, *Ridiculus Mns!*

We shall not suggest so much as Charity seems to give room for here, (*viz.*) that this is done to insinuate that this War was begun without good Motive; but we must justify ourselves, in taking Leave to say, it is plainly done to insinuate, that we are in no Condition to carry it on, and that the End we aim at cannot be obtained: This is not only implied, but expressed;
of

of the Honesty and Justice of this which the Reader be judge.

This is a full Answer to the Book as far as Page 10, where the Author begs another Question, which however, no Body, who understand Things with any Measure of Light, can grant him, (*viz.*) *That we are not the most immediately concern'd in this War, or in the Good or Ill Fortune, as he calls it, of the War.* This may we suppose without any Censure for forcing a Meaning upon him, be express'd thus, (*viz.*) *That the Dutch are Principals in this War, and we are only Auxiliaries, and that we have not equal Concern in the Event of it.*

If this were so we, would offer one Query to this Author, which may have some Difficulty in it, (*viz.*) Whether this does not more effectually justify the former Ministry, if they had, as these People say, made the *Dutch* Master of the Conditions? For if the *Dutch* are Principals in the War, and more *immediately concern'd* in the Good or Ill Fortune of it, so are they in the End of it also; and it seems very reasonable, that those of the Allies, who are most immediately concern'd in the Success of the War, should be so also in the End of it.

This is an Argument, which if we should press too far upon our Adversary, will give such a Shock to all that he has said, or can
say,

say, upon this Head, that he must greatly regret this Stumble at the Threshold; and therefore we shall spare him a little here, only suppose that he forgot himself in this Point, perhaps we shall find he will make Amends in the next.

But as an Error in the first Concoction is not remedy'd in the second, one Mistake being generally the Consequence of another, so it has been here; for now he comes to tell us, that we having been so Generous to contribute more than the Principal Party, and ought at least to have a Share in what is Conquer'd from the Enemy.

Now this still turning upon the same Mistake, runs into many other Errors; for if, as by this New System, the *Dutch* are Principal in this War, and their Security is the Thing aim'd at, we, for our Share, ought, by this Rule, to take Part of that Security from them, that is *Flanders*, and perhaps give it away too when we have it; for it is not for our Interest to keep it if it were given to us; his Observation of this Kind ends in a Reflection upon the *Dutch*, as *Intermeddling with our Affairs*, prescribing to the Sovereign in *Her Domestick Concerns*, pressing us perpetually with *Unreasonable Demands*, and *Threatning at every Turn to break the Alliance if we did not comply*.

That

That this is a Part of that General Design, which we have so long seen a Party among us very busie in Carrying on, (*viz.*) to create Misunderstandings between us and our Allies, and sowing Dissention between the Two United Nations, the *British* and *Dutch*, so it is worth Regard ; how Inconsistent this is with what went before, and how Ill this Politick Author has placed his System, so as that one Phenomenon makes the other inconceivable ; for if the *Dutch* are Principles in this War, and we are only Auxiliaries, come into it for their Security meerly on Principles of Generosity, it cannot be Rational that they should *Threaten us upon every Turn if we will not comply with their Unreasonable Demands that they will break the Alliance* ; What had it been to us if they had broke it ? If they were more immediately concern'd in the Good or Bad Fortune of the War, they could never ha' threatened us with breaking the Alliance ; for that had been to Threaten themselves, like a Child that Threatens the Mother if she Correct it that it will go and Drown itself ; if we were not equally concern'd, or indeed more concern'd than the *Dutch*, in the Good or Bad Success of the War, it were for us to Threaten them we would break the Alliance if they did not comply *with us* ; to talk of their Threatning to break the Alliance if we did not comply *with them* is Monstrous

stirous and Absurd, a Thing so Inconsistent, that it stumbles any Reader in the rest, and makes him expect as little Candour thro' the Book as in this Article, in which perhaps he may not be deceived.

Nor have we any of the *Unreasonable Demands* aforesaid specify'd here which the *Dutch* have made of us, and for which they Threatned us so greatly; *which Demands*, had they been so evident could not but ha' been well worth this Author's while, in order to bring to pass that so desirable End of all the rest, (*viz.*) rendring the *Dutch* Odious to us. This, he being so ill able to do in the other Part, it may be rationally supposed he would not have failed of in this, if he had been furnished with Particulars.

In brief Answer to this we say in General, it is not doubted but if the Original Causes and Circumstances of this War be considered, it may appear that we are every Way as much, and as immediately, concern'd in this War as the *Dutch*; and in the Good or Bad Fortune of it, have as much to lose, and are in as much Danger of losing it, as they are, and had some Concern in it which they had not; and that particularly in the just Provocation given by the Enemy to the Sovereign, in fostering a Pretender to the Crown, and encouraging him to usurp the Title and Stile of the Kings of *England*. This, as the *Dutch*
could

could have no Share in, so some of the Writers of the same Side, with this Author, have said in Print, (especially the Famous *Abel Roper*, whose Employers, if not himself, are own'd to be the Oracle of the Party ;) tells us that *England* had not come into the War with the Emperor or the *Dutch*, or formed the Grand Alliance, if *France* had not brought them into the Necessity of it, by that Foolishness of setting up the Pretender after he had recognized by the Treaty of *Ryswick* the Title of King *William* ; if this be so we were so far in this from coming into this War as Auxiliaries to the *Dutch*, or the Emperor, that the *Dutch* rather came in to assist us, in obliging the King of *France* to do the Crown of *Great-Britain* Justice in the Points wherein they had been Injured before.

But to put this out of doubt, our Declaration of War which Her Present Majesty set forth, as expressing the True Reasons which moved Her to this War, is a full Answer to this Calumny cast upon the *Dutch*, wherein the seizing the *Spanish* Monarchy, and setting up the Pretender, are assign'd as the True Cause of the War ; this is a full Answer, tho' to it may not be improper to subjoin one Query to be added to the former, and which it may be very useful to the Author of the aforesaid Pamphlet to answer if he thinks he can, (*viz.*)

E

Whether

Whether this Nation of *Britain* is not as immediately concern'd to prevent the Exorbitant Power of *France* as any other of the Confederates?

It seems to be an unusual lessening the Concern we have in the Affairs of *Europe*, and making this Illand, whose Commerce is so great, Manufactures so considerable, and Dominions so much larger than the *Dutch*, have very little Influence upon the rest of the World, and the rest of the World very little Influence upon us; to say that we are not so immediately concern'd in the Good or Bad Success of this War as the *Dutch*, or as any the rest of our Confederates: It knocks on the Head all the Boasts and Pretences of Her Majesty's being at the Head of the Confederacy, and the *English* being Entitled to make the Peace, having so much to do with the War; it takes away all the Pretences we have to press the Allies to Treat, and to complain if they refuse; for they are Principal, and we but Auxiliaries, what have we to do with it? They ought to be Judges of it, we ought only to keep our Alliance, and according to the Condition thereof not enter into any Treaty without them.

So that it seemeth, if this Author's Foundation is right, all the Noise we have had, and the Reasons given why the *British* Court

Court should make the Peace, and why the Allies should comply with it, are knock'd in the Head at one Blow. Our Happiness is, that the Case is quite otherwise ; and indeed, tho' we are desirous of a good Peace with all our Hearts, yet we cannot think of it this Way, nor upon the Foot of this Man's Notion, could we in the least reflect either on the *Dutch*, or the Emperor, if they should entirely refuse us.

All our Pretensions to move our Allies to listen to Proposals of Peace, and to take Proposals from *France*, are founded upon the Queen of *Britain* being more immediately concerned in the good or bad Success of this War, and having been a Principal in the Beginning of it, and also the Chief or Head as to influence that Whole Body who have carried it on.

The Declaration of War set out by Her Majesty, *May 4. 1702.* has this at large set down as follows, and which we have here incerted, because it will appear whether we are immediately concern'd in this War or no.

*The Queen's Declaration of War
against France, May 4. 1702.*

ANNE R.

WHEREAS it hath pleas'd Almighty God to call us to the Government of these Realms, at a Time when our late Dear Brother, William III. of Glorious Memory, had, in Pursuance of the repeated Advice of the Parliament of this Kingdom, entred into Solemn Treaties of Alliance with the Emperor, the States-General of the United Provinces, and other Princes and Potentates, for preserving the Liberty and Ballance of Europe, and for reducing the Exorbitant Power of France, which Treaties are grounded upon the unjust Usurpations and Encroachments of the French King, who had taken, and still keeps possession of, a great Part of the Spanish Dominions, exercises an Absolute Authority over all that Monarchy; having seiz'd Milan and the Spanish Low-Countries by his Armies, and made himself Master of Cadiz, of the Entrance into the Mediterranean, and of the Ports of the Spanish West-Indies, by his Fleets, everywhere designing to invade the Liberties of Europe, and to obstruct the Freedom of Navigation and Commerce: And it being provided by the Third
and

and Fourth Articles of the foremention'd Alliance, that if in the Space of Two Months, which are some time expired, the Injuries complain'd of were not remedied, the Parties concerned should mutually assist each other with their whole Strength: And whereas, instead of giving the Satisfaction that ought justly to be expected, the French King has not only proceeded to farther Violence, but has added thereunto a great Affront and Indignity to us and our Kingdoms, in taking upon him to declare the Pretended Prince of Wales King of England, Scotland and Ireland, and has influenc'd Spain to concur in the same Affront and Indignity, as well as in other Oppressions; we find ourselves oblig'd, for maintaining the Publick Faith, for vindicating the Honour of our Crown, and to prevent the Mischief which all Europe is threatened with, to Declare, and we do hereby accordingly Declare, War against France and Spain; and placing our Entire Confidencoe in the Help of Almighty God in so Just and Necessary an Undertaking, we will, in Conjunction with our Allies, vigorously prosecute the same by Sea and Land; being assured of the ready Concurrence and Assistance of our Subjects, in a Cause they have so openly and warmly espoused. — &c.

Here we see who were Principals, and why the War was entred into by England, and whether we were Auxiliaries to the Dutch,
yea,

yea, or no ; nay, you see it evident it was at the repeated Desire of the People of *England*, and the Addreffes from all Parts testify that it was so.

It has been judged needful to insist upon this so long, not for any great Use this Author is qualified to make of the Suggestion, but rather to oppose and contradict that New Notion, which now happens to be made use of, especially by a Party, that this War was not begun, or carried on, upon our Account, and that therefore we are not under equal Obligation to see it brought to so good an Issue ; or in brief, that we are to make Peace ; that let it go which Way it will we are not so much concern'd as our Neighbours ; and that therefore if they will carry it on, they may do it by themselves.

This we oppose as most pernicious, that has at Bottom in it a no less Contrivance than a Delivering us all up to *French* Power, and the giving up our Allies also in the Approaching Treaty. Now, tho' we shall not say one Word against a good Peace, which we wish for with all our Hearts ; nor against a Treaty in concert with our Allies, in which the Offers the Enemy may make shall be seen, and may be fully discuss'd, judg'd of, and debated about by all the Confederates ; yet to have any Thing said that should seem to make us willing that Treaty should End
to

to the Prejudice of our Allies, or to lessen the Securities which ought to be insisted on in that Treaty for the Peace of *Europe*, on Pretence that it is not of an equal, or of so immediate Concern to this Nation; this is a Notion every Honest *Englishman* must abhor as Dishonourable to the Queen, Reproachful to the Nation, False to the Grand Alliance, Destructive to the General Safety of *Europe*, and a Plot to strengthen the *French* King; and this is the only Reason why we have taken such a hold of this Article, which it is probable the Author might think he had hid so close *Anguis in Herba* among Fine Words, that the Poison should not ha' been discerned.

Thro' this whole Book he goes on upon this Mistake, and therefore, thro' our whole Reply, we must detect the Fraud of it.

He recites several former Wars, such as of the Barons, the Wars in *France*, *Scotland*, *Holland*, and the Rebellion; but makes no use thereof but to say they did not bring us in Debt, tho' he thought fit to forget the shutting up the *Exchequer* in the Time of the *Dutch* War, and which that War was made a Pretence for; which Debt is not paid to this Day.

But coming to the Revolution, he says, Page 12, a General War broke out to check the Ambitious Designs of *France*; and here the Emperor, the *Dutch*, and *England*, were Principals. This

This is so notoriously False in Fact that it cannot be past over; he should ha' said, as he talks now, *England* was Principal, and the Emperor and *Dutch*, tho' not so immediately concern'd, came generously in to contribute their Whole as Auxiliars; for all the World knows the War began in Defence of the Quarrel of King *James*; and for this we refer to the Declaration of War which *France* exhibited at that Time, where it is given as a Cause, (*viz.*) to Succour King *James*; and the Declaration of King *William* and Queen *Mary*, where the Causes are expressly said to be the Revolution, and the *Dutch* aiding in it. Also the Threatning Letter sent by the King of *France* to the States, when they were preparing to assist *England*, intimating that he should take it for a Rupture of the Peace; so that nothing is more False than to say that the Emperor or the *Dutch* were Principals in that War, any farther than as they came in to support, or procure, the Revolution in *England*.

Nor is it improper to note, what seems very suitably quoted, to bring to some Peoples Minds what first brought the *Dutch* into this War; and how ill we had been able to bring to pass, or to attempt indeed, any Thing towards our Deliverance at that Time without the *Dutch*; and how all the Expence of Blood and Treasure, which has been

been brought upon the *Dutch* by this long War, begun in their assisting us to regain that very Liberty and Power which we now make use of so much to deprectate and condemn them; the Gratitude, Justice, Honour, Equity whereof, we leave to the Contemplation of Futurity, Heartily wishing we may never come to want the *Dutch* again, lest we lay before them a strong Temptation to refuse us.

From hence for several Pages the Author runs on in Reproaches upon those, who first, to carry on the War, had Recourse to Borrowing Money upon Funds; it is not worth while here to enter into a Defence of the Projectors of that Age; we shall not say any Party was concern'd in it; the Author says weakly it was done to hook the Nation in, by lending their Money to protect the Government. But there is much more Justice in saying that the Nation labour'd under many Difficulties, the Coin unsettled, the War in its Infancy, and greatly encreasing, Trade suffering great Convulsions at that Time, and the Sum demanded being greater than had been heard of; we knew not our own Strength, and it was judg'd even by us, and many of those who now reflect on it, that it was much better to borrow large Sums, and pay Interest, than lay so vast a Weight on the Nation at once; and whoever will look back Impartially on
D those

those Times, will easily be convinc'd that there was no other visible Way to levy what was wanted ; the Scarcity of Money, the Deficiency of Trade, and the Nation unaccustomed to Taxes ; now let them say, being considered, how they would have rais'd the Sum they wanted within the Year ? A Method no Ministry have ever thought fit to venture at since, tho' many have thought fit to reflect upon the other.

The long Deduction of Reasons for, or against, our entering into the last War, which our Author insists on, are not worth any Answer here, the Reader is left to judge of them even as they lye ; but that we could have no Security for our Commerce, or against the Exorbitant Power of *France*, these are so Essential Reasons, for that they are infinitely Superior to all that has been alledged against the War : The People of *England* were so sensible of the Threatning Greatness of *France*, and of our being immediately concerned in it, that they never came in with more Alacrity into any War than into this ; addressing from all Parts of the Nation to the King to begin it with all Speed. To say then, that we ought only to ha' been Auxiliaries in this War, is a manifest Token of Gross Politicks, seeing the Loss of Commerce, and of Liberty, the one by the *Spanish* Monarchy falling to *France*, and the other by

the Exorbitant Power of the King of *France*, aiming at enslaving *Europe*, were most Essential Articles to us; he that will not allow it, must give us a very small Share in the Things called Commerce, and Liberty, or own that we very little understood the Value of them.

For this Reason, when the *Dutch* in their Declaration of War alledged the more immediate Dangers which threatned their State, as part of the real Cause of their beginning the War; yet our Adversary has not honestly quoted their Declaration, forgetting, rather purposely omitting, to quote the other Reasons they give for their declaring War, such as these.

“ That the *French* King having carried

“ on his exorbitant Power to that De-

“ gree, which the Christian World

“ had so long apprehended, had

“ laid suitable Foundations for the

“ obtaining the *Universal Monarchy*;

“ in order thereunto, sending a For-

“ midable Army into *Italy*, &c.

“ That seizing on the *Spanish* Ports in

“ *Spain*, *Italy*, and the *Indies*, he

“ made himself entire Master of the

“ Commerce of *Europe*.

“ That his Imperial Majesty, together

“ with the Circles of the Empire,

“ being oppress’d by the Invasions of
 “ the *French*, had thought fit to de-
 “ mand the Assistance of the States;
 “ and that they (the States) by
 “ their former Alliances and En-
 “ gagements, were bound and oblig’d
 “ to yield them that Assistance.

Ought not our Adversary, regarding the Justice of an Historian, with Faithfulness to have quoted these Things, as well as those which more especially regarded the private Interest of the States? But well he knew that if he did so he should forthwith overthrow, or blow up, his own Charge, which he purposely brings against the *Dutch*, of entering into this War upon no Publick Account, and thereby proving, (how well let it now be seen,) that they were more immediately concern’d in it than the *English*. Had he quoted these, it would have been known to all who thought fit to regard Reason and Truth, that the Heads of Reasons abovesaid, and the Clauses in Her Majesties Declaration, are the same; and that the *Dutch* and the *English* made War upon one and the same Bottom; To wit, for maintaining the Publick Faith, and to prevent the Mischiefs which all Europe is threatn’d with; only that if there was any Thing to weigh to make one Side more a Principal than another in the War,

War, it was on our Side ; To wit, to vindicate the Honour of the Crown. (*Vide* the same Declaration,) that is, the setting up the Pretender, which the *Dutch* had no Concern in, but on our Behalf.

From this Observation it seems evident our Author has nowhere bound himself up to Rules, or taken any Care to quote Impartially, but just as may serve a Private Design, managed with Partiality and Injustice.

From these Corrupted, False, Foundations he erects a Fabric as Corrupt, founding the Arguments upon his own bare Narration of Fact without Evidence, and running on to a mighty length, in reproaching our Ministry at Home, and Confederates Abroad, with Injurious Dealings in all the managing the late War ; how well, these Things are put together a little Enquiry may shew.

We have now brought him to Page 20, where he undertakes to prove, *First*, " That
" against all Manner of Prudence or Com-
" mon Reason we engaged in this War as
" Principals, when we ought to have acted
" only as Auxiliaries.

This we think is already answered, and fully confuted ; and therefore there seems little Occasion of saying any Thing to it, unless we should enter upon a long Recapitulation of the Indecencies and Scandals with
which

which he treats, and loads those, who, with Faithful Designs, and a Conduct join'd with all that Human Prudence could at that Time dictate, carried on the Publick Affairs; and altho' these Things seem to be the main Design of this Book, yet, as we content ourselves to overthrow, by Substantial Reasons, the Foundation upon which all that Scandal is grounded, we think that is so Effectual a Vindication of the Persons, and Transactions together, that the last being explained, the first are cleared in the just Consequences of the other, and therefore we take no other Notice of it.

The next Objection which requires Notice is Page 24, a Notable Explanation of the Clause in the Treaty of Grand Alliance, (*viz.*) *shall assist each other with their Whole Strength.* This our Politic Author, still upon the Suggestion as before, that we were less Interested in the Quarrel than any of our Allies, takes upon him to construct in Prejudice of the Vigorous Efforts made by us in these last Years of the War.

He had before mentioned, and owned, the continued Successes of the War; now he would not that we should have exerted ourselves so to the utmost, as we have done; but does not say one Word, whether he thinks all those Successes could have been obtained if we had not; or if we had been now left a Nation, unless

unless in Bondage to *France*, if those Victories had not been obtain'd ; all Men know the March of the Duke of *Marlborough* into *Bavaria*, and the Victory at *Blenheim*, saved the Empire ; they that hate the Success of it, own and speak it with Regret. The Elector of *Bavaria* had in one Summer put an End to the *Austrian* Greatness but for that Battle ; Monsieur *Tallard* has own'd it, the King of *France* owns it ; and as Clear it is, that the March of that Army, and the Victory obtain'd there, were effected by *English* Valour, *English* Councils, and *English* Money ; had we exerted ourselves less, had not that Glorious Action been done, let this Author tell us what had been the Case of *England* and *Holland* ? When the King of *France* having the *Spanish* Monarchy in his Hands on one Side, and his Creature, or Tool, the Duke of *Bavaria* set up by him in the Imperial Throne on the other Side, should have then turn'd his whole Power upon us ? Was it best for us to exert ourselves before-hand, and break those Measures in their Infancy, or to ha' staid till all that Gordian Knot had been tied, and then have exerted ourselves to unty it again ? When all our Endeavours had been but like the struggling of a Drowning Man to strangle himself the faster.

Here the Contemn'd Prudence of the late Ministry appeared beyond the Power of all
the

these Attempts to lessen it; and the Share of the Trophies and Prisoners bear Testimony what Share we had in that Action: How these Things would ha' been brought to pass if we had stood off as Auxiliaries, as this Gentleman proposes, is very hard for any Man that knows the State of Europe at that Time to imagine; and it had been obliging indeed if he had thought fit to have shewn us the Probability of it.

This brings in his Second Head, (*viz.*) a long Complaint against the Manner of our making War, (*viz.*) in Flanders, and not in the West-Indies, which he sums up thus.

We have turned the whole Force and Expence of the War, where the Enemy was best able to hold us at a Bay, utterly neglecting that Part, which would have saved and gained us many Millions of Money.

The Ground of this Complaint is pointed at the Duke of Marlborough and the Dutch, and has been sufficiently answered by the Conduct of the Affairs since that, which has brought them to acknowledge that we were right before, and to put the very same Thing in Practice again.

The Clamour of Conquering Flanders for the Dutch, gratifying the Ambition of the Duke of Marlborough, &c. was raised to a very great height at the beginning of the last War, and a New Word of Fashion brought
on

on the Stage, (*viz.*) *especially in Spain*; but, as this Author expresses it with some Gall, turning the whole Force where the Enemy was best able to hold us at Bay, he ought rather, as Experience has all along made it good, to have said, turning our whole Force where the Enemy always made the greatest Efforts, and were in most likelihood of breaking in upon us. For had it been thought fit, as these Politicians have often suggested, to have kept on the Defensive only in *Flanders*, and have thereby let the Enemy, by their great Superiority, have taken every Year a Town, Two or Three, as we have done, let him satisfy the World what Condition we had been in before now. But the Nature of Things has proved very clearly, that the pinching the King of *France* in *Flanders*, and pressing him on his own Frontiers, has done more to humble and break his Force than twice that Progress in another Place; One *Ramellies* more sensibly affected him than Two *Blenheims*, or *Turins*; and this is farther evident, in that, whenever you find him pinch'd in *Flanders* he always sends for his Troops from other Places, whatever Views, or probable Enterprizes, he had before him: This has been the Occasion of disappointing him so often in his Attempts upon the *Rhine*, which you have always done, not by Armies there, but by pushing him in *Flanders*,

as the Place upon which the Sum of all his Affairs depends.

We have found by our Experience, that *Flanders* is not the Place where he, the King of *France*, is best able to keep us at Bay; for there we have all along push'd and gain'd Ground upon him; but in *Spain* he has kept us at Bay indeed, and may well do so to the End of the Affair, where, by the Publick Account, it appears that every Foot-Soldier costs us 26 *l.* 8 *s.* Sterling before we can set him on Shore; besides the Loss upon those that die, where the distance of Place makes sudden Relief, or sudden Advice, Impracticable in Case of Disaster, and where the *French* can maintain a Thousand Men Cheaper than we can maintain a Hundred; and yet the first Complaint we have had against the late Ministry, was for carrying on the War in *Flanders*, and mightily applauding the War in *Spain*; but now we are taught by Experience, that *Jargon* is laid by; their New Hero *Ar—le*, that was so much to mend the Work of those that went before him, is coming back as much loaded with Honour and Success as those that went before him, and convinc'd by the Necessity, you are obliged to go on just where you did before.

As to the carrying the War into *Mexico* and *Peru*, a Thing not thought of till the last Experiment of the Impracticableness of
the

the War in *Spain*, and the Project of the *South-Sea*, we shall be ready to own the Advantage when we see it once attempted with Success; nor whenever the Attempt is made can we be under any Concern, if any of our Allies should envy our Attempts upon that Side, *First*, Because it is an Answer sufficient to the Emperor, to say he agreed in the Grand Alliance that we might do so. *Secondly*, It is an Answer sufficient to the *Dutch*, to tell them they may do the same Thing also if they please; so that this mighty Cavil, for it can be called no other, is knocked down by the Experience of this very last Campaign, in which, the Armies in *Spain*, with all their Supplies, New Generals, New Forces, and a Mighty Sum of Money, have done no more than to stand still, and be cannonaded in their Camp by the Contemptible *Spaniards*.

At last he comes to his main Article, which is the Behaviour of our Allies to us in the carrying on this War, and this appears to be the Design of the Book, in order to prepare us to use them accordingly in the ensuing Affair of Peace.

His first Complaint is, at the Terms of our Treaties, Offensive and Defensive with *Portugal*; where he quarrels, the great Assistance we are to give them if invaded, and the little Assistance they were to give us, but does not acquaint us with the Necessity we

were in of that Alliance ; how, and by whom, it was neglected at the first of the War ; how, without it, we had not a Port to have Recourse to between *England* and *Genoa* in *Italy* ; how we had a Trade to carry on thither worth all the Articles of Support the Ministry could stoop to, from whence we import Yearly a Million of Gold, and export as many Manufactures as formerly used to be sent both to *Portugal* and *Spain*. He forgets the Offers the King of *France* had made at that Time, and often since, to draw the King of *Portugal* from us ; and what a Stagnation of Commerce we had at Home till that Trade was opened. The Difficulty of a War with *Spain* without it, and many other Things, which infinitely over-balance the Offers he mentions in our Treaty ; owning at the same Time, that if *England* and *Holland* is invaded by *France*, the King of *Portugal* shall give Ten Men of War to our Aid, *that is*, shall thereby keep his own Coasts open for Trade, and free from the *French* Privateers, and shall declare at the same Time with us against *France*. But this Author discovers in this, and every other Part of his Book, that his Business is only to raise Dust upon the Conduct of those that then acted, that the World may be blinded with the Cloud of it, and may be prepared, as above, to believe, that the Reason of breaking thro' any of the former

former Measures is founded in the Errors which they pretend to find in them.

Let the Conditions with *Portugal* be never so much to their Advantage, or our Dishonour, as they presume; 'tis evident you lost him at the first of the War for want of those Conditions, and the King of *France* offer'd him so much to keep him, that till you out-bid the *French* you could not have him.

If it be return'd, that the *Portuguese* are Mercenary, Impatient, and make their Advantage of our Circumstances, we have nothing to say to it, then it must be so, and who can help it? The Question is not what the *Portuguese* are? But whether we wanted them, or no? And whether it had not been more Disadvantage to us to have let the *French* have them, who have frequently since offer'd much larger Terms to them than they had of us? These Things considered, tho' I were the worst Enemy the late Ministry had in the Kingdom, I could lay nothing to their Charge in this Treaty; for all was to be set against the Necessity we were in of such an Ally, the Advantage it would have been to the Enemy to have kept him on their Side, the Diversion that Article has been to their Troops, and the unspeakable Damage that War has been to the most Flourishing Provinces of *Spain*; and it must be own'd, the little Articles of command-
ing

ing our Men of War when in their own Ports, which may be a Feather put into the King of *Portugal's* Cap to please his Pride only, are of no Manner of Signification to us; for which Trifles, for they are no other, we enjoy, with them, the greatest Export of *British* Produce, Manufactures, and Corn, with the greatest Return in Specie, that is now left us in the whole Article of our Commerce.

Besides which, this Article, how ill soever managed, has kept 25 or 30000 Men, Garrisons included, of the *Spanish* Troops always employ'd, and put them to a very great Expence in *Spain*, when Money has been very scarce; whereas, had the King of *Portugal* been engaged with *France*, all those 25 or 30000 Men, and perhaps 4 or 5000 *Portugal* Horse with them, had appeared in *Catalonia*, or in *Dauphine*, against us; which would, as Matters have succeeded, have long since sent King *Charles* out of *Spain*.

This may serve for a General Answer to the Objections raised against other Treaties, which are much of the same Nature, only that the Reflections made on them are yet more gross. It must, no doubt, make our Merchants smile to hear this experienced Author give an Account of the Demands of the *Dutch* in the Treaty of Succession and Barrier: How he suggests, because the *Dutch* lock up the Ports in *Flanders*, and lay equal Duties

Duties upon Goods brought into other Places, as are already laid in the *Scheld*, that therefore he shall encourage that industrious People to Trade. Were this Author as well acquainted with Trade, as he seems to have been privately inform'd of Affairs of State, (which Information must have been on Purpose for the writing this Book, as may by plentiful Evidence be made good on Occasion,) he would not have put such a Banter upon himself, as to talk of the *Flemmings* falling into the *English* Manufactures, and ruining the Trade of our Woollen Goods, and taking away the Employments from our Poor, if he had read any of *Deſoe's Reviews* upon Trade, he must have been able to confute himself; or did he know the History of Trade in General, or the more valuable History of *Tom Thumb*, he might have known, that to make a Country able to make Woollen Manufactures, there is one particular Thing generally useful in order to the carrying those Manufactures on successfully; and this Thing is called in the West of *England* Wooll. Had this Author read his *A. B. C.* in the *English* Trade, he would have been told that the Way by which we in this Kingdom Ereded our Manufactures, robb'd the *Flemmings* of all their Trade, made the gross of their Workmen run over hither for Employment, and the rest turn their Hands to
other

other Things, was all by prohibiting our Wooll being Transported to them, without which Vehicle Authors generally agree they could not very well go on.

Now, as the Case stands, would we freely export our Wooll (which for ought we know, when the New Confederacy with *France* comes to Perfection, we may incline to) we need not question but the *Flemmings* would immediately fall into our Manufactures, without any help of Encouragement from the *Dutch*; and without our Wooll, which it is manifest all the World cannot supply, (the Queen of *Great-Britain's* Dominions only excepted,) the *Dutch* and the Devil, tho' joining their Wits together, can make nothing of it, nor do the least Thing that looks like it. So that if the Author has nothing else to terrify the People about, as to the *Dutch* enlarging their Barrier in *Flanders*, the Danger is of no Moment at all, and by Consequence the frightful Idea's which the late Ministry ought to have had in their Heads, are a meer *Brutum Fulmen*, empty and insignificant; nor was it ever worth the Thought of our being jealous of the Greatness and Power of the *Dutch* in that Particular.

Our Author forgets in all this to take the least Notice how the *French*, by all possible Artifice and Politicks, insinuated among the People in the *Spanish Low-Countries*, the En-

croachments

croachments and Oppressions of the *Dutch*, and propagated thereby the Aversions of that People to the Confederates, from whom, on all Occasions, they have shown their Readiness to revolt, and to fall in with the *French*; and it would ha' been in vain to pretend to make *Flanders* a Barrier to *Holland*, without giving the *Dutch* the Military Government in the Towns which they were to possess; but that to give them the Military Government was to give them the Civil, was so far from being a Consequence, that the Experience of the Inhabitants of those Towns, which the *Dutch* are possess of, daily contradict it; neither would the Civil Government of the *Low-Countries* be any Advantage to the *Dutch*, other than that it might more effectually secure the Possession, but would bring the whole Weight of any War that might happen to lye upon the States singly; whereas now in the separate Capacity those Countries are in, it always involves the Emperor as King of *Spain* in the War, if ever *France* falls upon the *Netherlands*: So that the Weakness of this Pretence appears manifestly; and if you would offer the Sovereignty of the *Netherlands* to the *Dutch* they would not care to accept it; the Possession of it, by any Nation but the *French*, being much more to their real Interest, as it brings those Princes to embark always their

F

other

other Dominions also in any War that happens there, for the Preservation of those Provinces; all these Things being considered, the Prudence of the late Ministry, in giving Way to the Demands of the *Dutch* upon the *Low-Countries*, in order to an effectual Barrier, cannot be blam'd at all; the Evil Consequences, if they possess'd all the *Low-Countries*, being of no Moment to *England*. But then the Encroachments of the *Dutch*, in this Case, are reflected upon by our Author with a great deal of Acrimony. But sure our Author forgets how, when after the Peace of *Ryswick*, the *French* thought fit to seize on the *Spanish* Monarchy; the *Dutch*, for want of having the Military Government of the Towns given them for their Barrier, were at once not only turn'd out of their Possession, and that Barrier lost at one Blow, for which so much Blood had been spilt, and Treasure spent, in that War; but their Troops were shamefully betrayed by the *Spanish* Governours, and delivered up Prisoners to the *French*. Let any Thinking Man tell us then, if when a Barrier is again determin'd to be given them, they ought to be satisfied to be under *Spanish* Governours again; and run the Hazard of having that Barrier surprized, and lost a second Time? Our late Ministry also had been for ever to be blam'd, and to be charged with betraying *England* as well as *Holland*, and
with

with a Design of joining with the Enemy to lose the great End of this War on that Side to all the Confederates, if they should have denied to use their utmost Interest with the Confederates to get that Barrier secured by sufficient Means. It has always been look'd upon, even in King *Charles II's* Time, that *Flanders* is a Barrier to *England* as well as to *Holland*; and when King *Charles II.* had been Instrumental to raise the *French* Greatness to the highest Pitch, yet when he found the *French* invading *Flanders* he took the Alarm, and owning, that it was the Safety of *England* to have a strong Barrier there for the Security of the States, he join'd with the *Dutch*, and the King of *France* thereupon made him Umpire, or Mediator, at the Treaty of *Nimeguen*.

Thus Two Things appear thro' all this Part of our Author's Complaint, (1.) Gross Ignorance of the Fact; and, (2.) A strenuous soliciting the Popish and *French* Interest, endeavouring to blame the *Dutch* for seeking, and the late Ministry for joining in it, that Hold in *Flanders*, which is the only Security, not of *Holland* only, but of *England* also.

He would appear Ignorant at the same Time that he urges these Things, that would the *Dutch* ha' made a separate Peace with *France*, which this Author plainly insinuates we should now do, the King of

France made broad Significations of his being ready to give them, not the Military Government only, but the full and entire Possession of all the *Spanish Low-Countries*, in compleat Sovereignty, and as their own; and that King *Philip* should give them the Title and Resignation in the Amplest Form, retaining only to *France* the Province of *Artois* and the *Pays Conquis*, which had been conceded in his Favour by former Kings of *Spain* at the Treaties of *Aix la Chapelle*, and *Nimeguen*; if then the *Dutch* refused these Advantageous Offers rather than abandon their Allies and Confederates, or entertain any separate Treaty; it would appear very unkind that we should ha' scrupled promising to procure for them the Military Government of the Barrier they were to have, for want of which they had been betray'd before, and without which they could no Way secure it to be an Effectual Barrier when they had it. Thus this Author reproaches the last Ministry, as he does in many Things more, with that which was the Effects of their Justice, Prudence, and Fidelity, both to their Allies, to the Confederacy, and to their own Country.

The rest of this Kind of Charge is of the same Kind, only we must observe how he takes upon him to correct the Ministry for letting the little Princes of *Germany* insult them,

them, by threatning upon all Occasions to recal their Troops, tho' it was known they must rob or starve at home, and to demand the Payment of Subsidies in an Insolent Manner.

Altho' this is no Charge upon the late Ministry, yet it is not amiss to notice it a little, because it lets the Reader into some Views of this Author's Design which are not otherwise seen.

Every one knows whose Project it was, at the First of this last War, to hire Foreign Troops for the War, rather than to raise a sufficient Number of our own People. The Pretences were, the Avoiding a standing Army, the Sparing *English* Blood, and some ill-natur'd ones, remote to the present Case: This was practiced by that Party to such a Degree, that they paid Multitudes of Foreigners, at the same Time that many Hundreds of the Old Disbanded Officers of King *William's* Army receiv'd half Pay at Home, and were kept out of Employment. If this subjected you to the Exorbitant Demands of those Powers and Princes of whom you hired them, who taking Advantage of the Want you were in of Troops, made hard Terms with you, and enforced those Terms with telling you, if you would not comply they must have their Troops again; this must go to the Account of those
Councils

Councils which thought our own Men not proper to be trusted ; and if it be enquired who that was — it will hardly fall among the Old Ministry, let him make the Search where he thinks good.

Yet after all, is this any more than every Shopkeeper does when he comes to Buy Goods ? Or any Ostler when you go to hire a Horse ? Or to come nearer to the Landed Men whom our Author is so concern'd to defend ; Is it any more than every Landlord does when he sees a Tenant in great Need of his Farm ? If this was an Error in the late Ministry, why has not this Ministry rectified it ? Why did ye not let the *Prussian* Troops go Home out of *Italy*, and the *Saxons* and *Danes* out of *Flanders*, and see where you would ha' supplied their Places with Troops ? Whole Masters, when their Subsidies were unpaid, would not ask for them ? And when long delay'd would not say, if they were not paid they would recall their Troops ? Where is the Landlord of them all, who will not send his Tenant Word, that if he does not pay his Rent he will turn him out of his Farm ? The Thing carries but Reason with it, and all the Blame he would lay upon the Ministry vanishes of Course.

From

From these Complaints he comes to a long Enquiry after our Allies for not performing the Stipulations of their Treaties; which he lays on the Emperor, the King of *Portugal*, and the *Dutch*; how far this may, or may not, be true it is not for us to examine: We may without any Prejudice to the Old Ministry take it for granted. But so much the harder Game had the Old Ministry to play, having a Vigorous, Forward Enemy to deal with, and Backward, Unperforming Allies to go on with: What could the Ministry do? Did they want any Representations and Earnest Sollicitations? Did they fail in shewing a good Example? And when no more could be done, to the Honour of Her Majesty, and of their Zeal for the Common Cause, they chose rather to exert themselves, even beyond what could be expected, and to bear rather more than they were bound to do, of Charge and Expence, than to let the Common Service sink, and the great Cause they had in hand suffer. This ought to be recorded for their Immortal Honour, and represents them to be true Fathers of their Country, true Defenders of the Protestant Cause, and Promoters of the Honour of the Queen, who by this Zeal of theirs obtain'd most justly the Title of Head of the Confederacy.

But

But by the Measures this Author recommends, the Ministry should have gone no faster than the most Backward of the Allies; they must have sent Word to the *Dutch* and the Emperor, that if they would not furnish as they had stipulated, and pay as they had agreed, neither would we. And what had been the End of such a Conduct? Then indeed the Nation would soon ha' seen an End of the War, and the Ministry had effectually betray'd and ruin'd us all: This is just as if a Fire happening in the Street, I should refuse to help quench it, because such a Neighbour does not work as well as I; or that I will carry no more Buckets of Water to it than such a Neighbour; the Consequence is that my House will be burnt down as well as his; which however insensible he may be of it, it is not my Business to make his Negligence the Rule of my Diligence; but my own Danger is the Thing I must have in View; and if Neighbours are not so Diligent as they should be, I may blame them, and use all possible Means to persuade and awaken them; but if I will sit still because they do not help as much as they ought to do, the Fire is neglected of Course, and the whole Street destroyed: Nor is it any Relief to say, they perish with me, for the Preservation of my own is my Business, not the Preservation of theirs.

This

This therefore, instead of reflecting on the Old Ministry is the greatest Panegyrick can be made upon them ; and had not this knowing Author been, (his New Information excepted) very Ignorant, he could never ha' given these Things such a Turn.

The Objections nevertheless against the Confederates for not complying with their Quota's require Two Things farther to be said, (1.) It is not forthwith to be granted that the Fact is true in all its Particulars, because this Author affirms it so positively ; nor has he entred into any Proof of the Particulars ; and having so plainly begg'd the Question, in some Cases, at his setting out, it cannot but give a justifying Ground of Supposition that he may do so in the rest ; but supposing it were true, it remains, (2.) To enquire as to the Reflection upon the Old Ministry, which Way they are to be charged in this Matter ? Whether the Daily Remonstrances, Memorials, and pressing Instances, of their Ministers and Ambassadors to those Allies, for the due Performance of their Stipulations and Agreements, are not standing Witnesses for the Ministry against the Charge of being easie to be imposed upon in this Matter ? How many Letters have we always heard of, immediately from the Queen to the Diet at *Ratisbone*, to the late Emperor, to the Respective Princes of the Empire,

to the States, to the Kings of *Portugal* and *Sweden*, to the Duke of *Savoy*, &c. to move them with all imaginable Earnestness to exert themselves in the Common Cause? How have our Envoys presented continually Memorials to tack and enforce those Perswasions, and to represent the Common Danger? So that let the Charge lye where it will it cannot lye against the Old Ministry, which is the Chief Intent of that Part of the Book.

The next Branch of the Design lyes to press us, since our Allies have, as he says, treated us so Ill, to trust them no farther, but to make Peace with *France* whether they will or no; and this he closes with pressing a Peace, tho' not on so good Foundations as might have been had Two Years ago, upon a Supposition, that by the same Consequence it will be worse Two Years hence, which we can see no Reason for but this; that if the New Measures had not been taken, perhaps it had not been worse now than it was Two Years ago, since it was a parent it was better Two Years ago than it had been Two Years before that; so if it be worse Two Years hence, it may be with Justice apply'd to that Change of the Measures which had made it first decline.

The Author of these Sheets is as willing to give up some Disputes about a Peace as any, and comes in freely with the Opinion of those People who are for a Treaty, and upon that Treaty for a Peace, if it be obtain'd upon Conditions of Honour and Advantage to the Confederates, and with Safety to the Continuance of it; but this Man plainly intimates, the making Peace upon giving up the Cause to the *French*, as what we are able

able no longer to defend. This is the greatest Satyr upon the New Ministry that could possibly be written; and what they cannot but resent in him, and what in their meer Justification we are obliged to remark upon.

The great Weight he puts upon our Mortgageing the Funds, and Entailing long and large Debts upon Posterity, it is evident is the Thing by which he enforces his Flegmatick Thoughts about carrying on the War; and that we have nothing left to carry it on farther but the Land-Tax and Malt-Tax: Now tho' this had been true, which it is evident by his own Words it is not; for the Article of General Excises he names himself, which has many Individuals and Branches, which may raise great Sums without the *Dizieme Denier*, as he calls it, on the Red Coat Collector; yet those who understand those Things offer to raise Funds yet a great while for Support of the Nation. So that tho' we are willing to own we stand in need of Peace, yet we can by no Means grant we stand so much in need of it, that the New Ministry can find out no Ways and Means any longer, but must make a Peace immediately, or sink under the War.

Not at all juster than this is his saying, that the Land-Tax must be continued after a Peace to support the Establishment, and that the Land must pay all the Nation's Debts; this, it is humbly conceiv'd, is a direct Mistake, to say no worse of it, since Trade as is above loaded with all the Debts, which are now depending, and not a Penny of them paid by the Land, tho' infinite Sums of the Interest upon Usury is thereby paid from the Trading to the Landed Men; yet is this Nation,

were Peace but once obtain'd, able even upon the Foot of Trade, without any Land-Tax at all, not only to support the Establishments and necessary Expence of the Nation, but gradually, and in reasonable Time, to lessen the Load of Debt from the Publick, and perhaps not leave their Posterity so engaged as some People expect; so that we need not apprehend so much from the Dishonest Grudging of our Children, which he suggests of them, that they will be such Knaves as not to pay their Fathers just Debts, or make good the Engagements made by us to preserve their Liberty and Religion, Sacred and Inviolable, to Succeeding Generations.

'Tis therefore far from being any Service to the present Ministry to deprectate the Strength of the Nation, or to bring them in making Peace with *France* upon such Terms as they can get, upon a Notion of being run on Ground in their Strengths, and in no Condition to continue the War.

To consent to a Treaty upon the Foot of trying what the *French* will offer, and how far they will comply with Reason, what Satisfaction they will give the Allies, and upon what Just, Secure Foundation Peace may be obtain'd, this the Ministry, no doubt, may be justified in; but as this Author represents it, we are only to ask of the *French* how much they will do for us, and to make the Thing up, Bankrupt like, on the best Terms we can. This is such a Satyr on the Ministry as they ought in the Highest Manner to resent, and we do not question but in their own Defence they will resent it.

The Meaning of the Ministry, (or the Honest Part of the Nation, is deceived in them,) is, that
France

France making Proposals of Peace, and promising sincerely *bona Fide* to treat in order to make a good Peace, and to give Satisfaction to the Allies in every just Demand, a Good and Effectual Peace may be obtain'd, such as may be Safe, Honourable, and Lasting; the Queen desirous of putting an End to this Bloody War as well and soon as may be, is willing to hearken to what the *French* will offer, She is willing to have a Treaty commenc'd; at this Treaty all Sides are to hear, and judge for themselves, whether the Proposals of *France* are Reasonable and Satisfactory, or no; if they are not, the War goes on of Course, and must be pushed on, for the Queen will not abandon Her Allies; if they are Satisfactory, a Peace is the Consequence of meer Course.

But this Author tells us plainly, we must comply with the *French* if they will not comply with us; and that whether they will give Satisfaction to the Allies, or no, we must make Peace, for we are not able, on any Terms, to carry on the War any longer; and to justify our doing this in the Teeth of the Allies, he employs his whole Book to make out Two Points.

I. That the War is theirs, not ours; that they are Principals, we but Auxiliaries; that it was the Error and Easiness of the late Ministry to bring us in for Principals, and therefore we may draw out when we will, whether they are satisfied or no, and whether the End of the War, (*viz.*) reducing the Power of *Europe* to a Ballance, be obtain'd or no.

II. That

II. That we are ill used, insulted, and maltreated by our Allies; that they have not perform'd the Conditions of the Alliances they have made; have not furnished their Quota's of Men, or paid their Share of the Subsidies, and that therefore we are to esteem our Obligations by the former Contracts as void, and are not obliged, or can be bound, by them any longer.

Now tho' an Arrogant Pamphleteer has gone this Length, we all know the Ministry or Her Majesty talk'd none of this Language. Nor is it the Interest of the Government to talk at this Rate: The Numbers of People in this Nation are many, who are as willing as possible, consisting with Honour and Justice, to bring this War to a Happy Peace, who yet abhor the Thoughts of abandoning our Allies, or complying with base and mean Conditions from France, and to urge either of these would arm all the Reason, Honour, Sense, and Virtue, of the Nation against the Ministry.

For which Reason we think it Defence of the Present Ministry, as well as of the Last, to detect the Frenchified Principles of this Author, which no wise Man can read without seeing the Fraud, or think of it without abhorring it.

FINIS.

